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Tort Reform: Blocking the Courthouse
Door and Denying Access to Justice
Joanne Doroshow1

The right of injured people to sue and collect compensation from the perpetrators of their
harm is one of the great achievements of American democracy. In our system, the poorest and
most vulnerable can challenge the largest corporation or institution and hold them accountable
for causing injury. With corporate wealth and power dominating the executive and legislative
branches of government, the civil courts are among the only places left in our American system
where individuals can successfully confront large companies on a somewhat level playing field.
And civil juries are the one arena where average citizens can participate directly in government,
where they can have a direct impact on events and ultimately the state of their lives. This paper
will discuss the importance of the civil jury system, and how recent changes in tort law – i.e.,
“tort reform” - are restricting access to civil justice by the sick and injured. We will address three
types of tort reforms that are having a particularly severe impact on access to the courts: caps on
damages, contingency fee limits, and forced arbitration clauses.
Introduction
The right to a civil jury trial is among our earliest rights as Americans. The American
colonists believed that trial by jury was an important right of freedom.2 England repeatedly
attempted to restrict the right to jury trial in the colonies, as colonial administrators made
increasing use of judge-tried cases.3 In virtually every major document and speech delivered
before the Revolution, the colonists portrayed trial by jury as, if not their greatest right, one that
was indispensable.4 In 1791, during its first session, Congress drafted the Bill of Rights, ratified as
the first ten amendments to the Constitution, securing the right to civil jury trial in the Seventh
Amendment.5
But the right to civil jury trial amounts to a guarantee without any practical significance if attorneys
are not available to help individuals navigate the legal system. Very few injured parties have the
financial resources to hire an attorney at an hourly rate. With medical expenses, disability, pain
	Adjunct Professor of Law & Executive Director, Center for Justice & Democracy at New York Law School. This
article is based in part on previously published studies, websites, blogs and other publications by the Center for
Justice & Democracy and by author Joanne Doroshow, writing for the Center for Justice & Democracy and the
Center for Study of Responsive Law.

1

	Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 639, 653–54 (1973).

2

	For example, on March 22, 1765, England passed the Stamp Act, which placed stamp duties on all legal documents,
newspapers, pamphlets, college degrees and other documents. “The British reasoned that since the American
colonists had been the chief beneficiaries of the expulsion of the French” after the 1754-63 French and Indian War,
“they should bear the financial responsibility for the government and defense of the American continent.” The Act
aroused strong opposition, in large part because the admiralty courts, which operated without juries, were given
jurisdiction to enforce the Act. American Bar Foundation, Sources of our Liberties 262–263 (Richard L. Perry & John
C. Cooper eds., 1959).

3

	
See generally Wolfram, supra note 2.

4

	The Seventh Amendment states, “In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any
court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.” U.S. Const. amend. VII. See generally
Wolfram, supra note 2.
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and often an inability to work, most injured people cannot afford to pay an attorney up front. As
one attorney told American Bar Association (“ABA”) Foundation researchers Stephen Daniels
and Joanne Martin, “The simple truth is at least 95% of our clients could not afford to pay the
lawyer and could not finance the lawsuit. They just couldn’t – at least 95%.”6
Moreover, unlike in England and some other nations,7 U.S. government-funded attorneys cannot
represent the injured who seek compensation in the United States. That is why the third option
– the contingency fee system - is so important. Under this system, an attorney agrees to take
an injury case without any money up front. The attorney fronts all costs and gets paid only if
successful. In return, the lawyer is entitled to a percentage of the money collected if the case
succeeds. But if the case is lost, the lawyer is paid nothing. This type of representation has been an
accepted (and even celebrated) arrangement for more than 150 years.8 Today “[m]any consumer
organizations, public advocates, labor unions, and plaintiffs’ lawyers view the United States’
system of contingency fees as nothing less than the average citizen’s ‘key to the courthouse door,’
giving all aggrieved persons access to our system of justice without regard to their financial state.”9
But in recent years, lobbyists for big corporations, medical societies and the insurance industry
have been pushing for government-imposed schedules and “caps” on both contingency fees and
on overall damage awards, making it more difficult for victims to access the civil justice system.
A. “Tort Reform” and Attacks on Justice
Laws that keep injured consumers from filing legitimate cases or obtaining compensation from
the companies responsible for causing their injuries, are commonly known as “tort reform.” The
“tort reform” movement has had devastating consequences for many vulnerable children and
families. It has also weakened the ability of the civil justice system to protect us all from injury
and disease, whether or not we ever go to court. That is because the prospect of civil liability
deters manufacturers, builders, chemical companies, hospitals and other potential wrongdoers
from repeating their negligent behavior and provides them with an economic incentive to make
their practices safer.10 Tort actions also force disclosure of often extremely important internal
information about unsafe products and practices, and force airing these disclosures through the
media. Often, corporations that may have blocked regulatory laws have been forced to change
harmful behavior because of lawsuits brought by individuals. Judges and jurors are free from the
influence of corporate lobbyists who wine and dine legislators and regulators, and who use their
influence to weaken safety laws.

	Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers: Dealing with the Possible but Not Certain, 60 DePaul L. Rev.
337, 348 (2011).

6

	See discussion of British system in Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80
Wash. U. L. Q. 739 (2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=907863; Elihu Inselbuch, Contingent Fees and Tort
Reform: A Reassessment and Reality Check, 64 Law & Contemp. Probs. 175 (2001), available at http://scholarship.
law.duke.edu/lcp/vol64/iss2/9/.

7

	Adam Shajnfeld, A Critical Survey of the Law, Ethics, and Economics of Attorney Contingent Fee Arrangements, 54
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 773, 775–776 (2009)), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1465164
(discussing the history of the contingent fee).

8

	Inselbuch, supra note 7, at 175.

9

	Conservative theorist Richard Posner has written that the tort system’s economic function is deterrence of non
cost-justified accidents, and that tort law creates economic incentives for “allocation of resources to safety.”
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 312 (1987). See also Meghan Mulligan
& Emily Gottlieb, Lifesavers: CJ&D’s Guide to Lawsuits That Protect Us All (2002), available at https://centerjd.org/
content/study-lifesavers-cjds-guide-lawsuits-protect-us-all.
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Before the mid-1970s, consumer rights organizations focused little time or energy on the tort
system. Until then, the common law of torts had generally operated without much political
interference, having evolved through the courts for generations - indeed centuries - to afford
citizens a means to challenge injustice and negligence. But that changed in the mid-1970s
when the nation experienced its first liability insurance crisis. Insurance rates for doctors and
some businesses suddenly started to skyrocket for no apparent reason.11 Insurers quickly blamed
what they believed was occurring in the country – a “litigation explosion.” They demanded huge
rate hikes from state regulators and convinced lawmakers that the only way to bring rates under
control was to limit the legal rights of injured victims.12
It “turns out that there never was a ‘litigation explosion.’”13 However, the political lessons learned
by the insurance industry were clear: by blaming lawyers and litigation for a crisis that the
industry itself had manufactured, the industry could obtain major changes in tort laws to reduce
or eliminate legitimate claims brought against businesses and professional groups.
B. How Tort Reform Restricts Access to Justice
Two tort reform proposals that have a significant impact on access to justice are caps on damages
and mandatory limits on contingency fees for plaintiff lawyers. In addition, companies are
making increasing use of “forced arbitration” clauses in consumer, employment and health care
contracts, preventing harmed individuals from accessing the civil justice system at all.
1. Caps on Damages
A damages cap is an arbitrary ceiling on the amount an injured person can receive in compensation
by a judge or jury, irrespective of what the evidence presented at a trial proves compensation
should be. The most typical cap proposals cover non-economic damages. Non-economic
damages compensate injured people for intangible but real “quality of life” injuries, like the loss
of a reproductive system, permanent disability, disfigurement, trauma, loss of a limb, blindness
or other physical impairment. As University of Buffalo Professor Lucinda Finley has written,
“certain injuries that happen primarily to women are compensated predominantly or almost
exclusively through noneconomic loss damages. These injuries include sexual or reproductive
harm, pregnancy loss, and sexual assault injuries.”14
Caps on damages usurp the authority of judges and juries, who listen to the evidence in a case, to
decide compensation based on each specific fact situation. Caps specifically on non-economic
damages discriminate against senior citizens, children, stay-at-home parents, low-income families,
or anyone with a relatively low level of economic or wage loss. According to Professor Finley,

11

	
See Malpractice - Doctors in Revolt, Newsweek, June 9, 1975 (“Like measles in a nursery, doctors’ strikes seem
to be erupting all across the nation. What the doctors are protesting is the skyrocketing cost of their malpractice
insurance premiums.”).
	For example, during this period California enacted a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages for malpractice
victims. Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.2(b).

12

	
Americans for Insurance Reform, Repeat Offenders; How the Insurance Industry Manufactures Crises
America 9 (2011), available at http://www.insurance-reform.org/studies/Repeat_OffendersFinal.pdf.

13

and

Harms

	Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 Emory L.J. 1263, 1266
(2004).
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[ J]uries consistently award women more in noneconomic loss damages than men
… [A]ny cap on noneconomic loss damages will deprive women of a much greater
proportion and amount of a jury award than men. Noneconomic loss damage caps
therefore amount to a form of discrimination against women and contribute to
unequal access to justice or fair compensation for women.15
Professor Joanna Shepherd of Emory University School of Law explained,
[B]y limiting certain types of damages relative to other damages, tort reform
disproportionately reduces both compensation and access to justice for specific segments
of the population. For example, existing studies show that caps on noneconomic
damages disproportionately reduce compensation to females, children, the elderly, and
the poor because a much greater proportion of their damage awards are in the form
of noneconomic damages. These demographic groups often have lower incomes than
other groups and, as a result, they have correspondingly less economic loss and relatively
more noneconomic loss. Thus, noneconomic damage caps act as a regressive tax on
their recoveries because they reduce the recoveries of lower-income plaintiffs by a higher
fraction than they reduce the recoveries of higher-income plaintiffs.16
As will be explained in more detail later, caps also make it more difficult for injured people to find
competent contingency fee attorneys to take their cases. California insurance defense attorney
Robert Baker, who had defended malpractice suits for more than 20 years, told Congress in 1994,
“[a]s a result of the caps on damages, most of the exceedingly competent plaintiff ’s lawyers in
California simply will not handle a malpractice case … There are entire categories of cases that
have been eliminated since malpractice reform was implemented in California.”17
2. Limits on Contingency Fees18
The contingency fee system provides anyone with a legitimate injury case, regardless of his or her
financial means, with access to an attorney. As noted earlier, the attorney takes a case without
charging any money up front and is paid only if the case is successful. Even organizations generally
known for their support of tort reform have recognized this critical function of the contingency
fee system. Associate Professors of Economics Alexander Tabarrok and Eric Helland of George
Mason University and Claremont McKenna College wrote a book about this topic, called Two
Cheers for Contingency Fees, published by the conservative American Enterprise Institute. In
it, the authors wrote, “A second advantage of contingent fees [the first being cost reduction] is
improved access to the legal system.”19 They also explained, “[c]ontingent-fee lawyers ‘screen’

	
Id.

15

	Joanna Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American Medical Liability System, Vanderbilt L. Rev. 151,
175 (2014) (citing Lucinda M. Finley, supra note 14, at 1264–65); Nicholas M. Pace et al., Capping Non-Economic
Awards in Medical Malpractice Trials: California Jury Verdicts Under MICRA 30–33 (2004); Eleanor D. Kinney et al.,
Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act: Results of a Three-Year Study, 24 Ind. L. Rev. 1275, 1288–89 (1991)).

16

17

	
See Jamie Court, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis Hoax, Multinational Monitor (Mar. 2003), http://www.
multinationalmonitor.org/mm2003/032003/court.html.
	This section is based on an earlier publication, Center for Justice & Democracy, Courthouse Cornerstone: Contingency
Fees and Their Importance for Everyday Americans (2013), available at http://centerjd.org/content/white-papercourthouse-cornerstone-contingency-fees-and-their-importance-everyday-americans.

18

	
Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Two Cheers
files/2005/08/22/20050817_book827text.pdf.

19
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potential cases and clients. In constructing a litigation portfolio for his firm, the lawyer will reject
weak cases and agree to handle stronger ones. This screening function is useful both for clients
and, most likely, for the legal system at large.”20
Today half the states in this country have some type of law dealing with contingency fees.21 Some
states simply allow for judicial review of fees while others cap fees at levels considered fair and
ethical, i.e., one-third.22 However, many state laws covering contingency fees prevent recovery of
“one-third” by using sliding scales, with the most severe limits on the highest award or the most
serious cases. New York’s law is a good example. New York limits contingency fees in medical
malpractice cases to 30 percent of the first $250,000, 25 percent of the second $250,000, 20
percent of the next $500,000, 15 percent of the next $250,000 and just 10 percent of anything
over $1.25 million.23 While such a fee may still seem like plenty of money, it is important to
understand what high-value cases can cost to bring, and how attorneys must evaluate risk before
taking any case on contingency.24 Indeed, the risk of losing the case completely is not the only risk
faced by contingency fee lawyers:
[R]ecovery or no recovery is only one part of the uncertainty inherent in litigation. The
other contingencies faced by the lawyer (and the client) include:
n

n

n

u ncertainty about the amount that will be recovered (and hence the fee the lawyer
will receive);
u ncertainty about what it will cost, in both effort and expenses, to obtain the
recovery; and
uncertainty about how much time will pass before the recovery is obtained.25

High-stakes cases, like medical malpractice cases involving catastrophic injuries, can be extremely
costly for the patient.26 Even Victor Schwartz, General Counsel of the American Tort Reform
Association, has said that it is “rare or unusual” for a plaintiff lawyer to bring a frivolous malpractice
suit because they are too expensive to bring.27 By allowing lawyers to distribute their risks among
cases, the contingency fee system allows attorneys to survive professionally even if they lose some
cases and are paid nothing. The more restrictions placed on the ability of a contingency fee
attorney to recover their costs and fees in cases they win, the less likely they will risk taking any
cases at all.
In 2009, researchers from RAND’s Institute for Civil Justice (ICJ) surveyed 965 plaintiffs’
attorneys who were presented with “hypothetical meritorious cases” and asked if they would take
the case given that either noneconomic damages caps or attorney fee limits were in effect. ICJ
20

	
Id. at 8.

21

	See full list in Center for Justice & Democracy, supra note 18, Appendix 1.

22

	
See, e.g., Mich. Ct. R. 8.121 (B).
N.Y. Jud. Law § 474-a(2).

23
24

	
Task Force on Contingent Fees, ABA Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Section, Report on Contingent Fees
in
Medical Malpractice Litigation 8 (2004), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/tips/contingent/
MedMalReport092004DCW2.pdf.

25

	Kritzer, supra note 7, at 748.

26

	David Goguen, The Challenges in Winning a Medical Malpractice Lawsuit, AllLaw, http://www.alllaw.com/articles/
nolo/medical-malpractice/challenges-winning-lawsuit.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2016).

27

	Mark A. Hofmann, White House Open to Medical Liability Changes, Business Insurance, http://www.
businessinsurance.com/article/20110130/ISSUE01/301309974 (last visited Feb. 9, 2016).
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concluded that caps and attorney fee limits each “make it harder to retain counsel.”28 In states
where both types of laws are in effect, the impact on victims with the most serious harm is even
more severe, as attorneys simply cannot afford to front high litigation costs when the possible
recoverable damages are so limited.
What’s more, noted the ABA Tort Trial and Insurance Practice Section, just as caps on noneconomic damages have a disproportionate impact on women, children, minorities and the poor,
so do attorney fee caps:
Elimination of, or significant constraints on, contingent fees would make legal assistance
available only to those injured persons who are wealthy. The poor, the retired, African
Americans, and women especially will suffer because they are often unable to afford
hourly fees.29
The reason caps on fees have had this impact is obvious: costs. As the ABA Tort Trial and
Insurance Practice Section report found, “imposing such limitations will likely preclude many
medical malpractice actions from being filed because the prospective damages and resulting
attorneys’ fees will not justify the expected time and expense associated with the litigation,”30
which often costs the attorney hundreds of thousands of dollars. Practically speaking, this means
that “[o]nly those most grievously injured by the grossest medical negligence would likely be
able to bring an effective action”31 and that, for many victims, limiting contingent fees “would
have virtually the same effect as prohibiting them.”32 Indeed, such limitations would have the
additional impact of driving attorneys out of the system altogether, particularly those specializing
in costly and complex cases like medical malpractice:
If prices for lawyer services are fixed below what the market would yield, lawyers will have
incentive to employ their services elsewhere, where their expertise and skill match the
demand for them…. Limiting contingent fees will likely squeeze lawyers out of medical
malpractice litigation, leaving some, perhaps many, victims with no representation.33
Indeed, the contingency fee system provides the injured with access not just to any lawyer, but to
one who is capable of fighting an insurance company on a somewhat level playing field. As the
ABA Tort Trial and Insurance Practice Section put it:
Limitations [on contingency fees] do not simply serve to ignore medical error and to
eliminate medical malpractice victims from the system, they also would shift meritorious
cases to less experienced (and therefore less expensive) lawyers. This could have the
effect of reducing the likelihood or amount of recovery. Plaintiffs would not really be
able to have the counsel of their choice and might have to settle for counsel unfamiliar
with the procedural intricacies of the specialized area of practice.34
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28

	Steven Garber et al., Do Noneconomic Damages Caps and Attorney Fee Limits Reduce Access to Justice for
Victims of Medical Negligence?, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 637 (2009).
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Task Force on Contingent Fees, supra note 24, at 32.
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Id. at 20.
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Id.

32

Id. at 8.

33

Id. at 29.

34

Id. at 33.
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At the same time,
there would be no limit on the number of lawyers the defense could employ or the
amount of fees those lawyers could charge. That creates a potential imbalance in favor
of the defense. Thus, even where medical malpractice victims could find representation,
the law would say to them, “you are not allowed to use a lawyer whose market valuation
is equivalent to those who might represent the defendant.”35
There is no question that the tort reform movement has been skillful in getting everyday Americans
to support this kind of imbalance while undermining their own constitutional rights of access
to the civil justice system. This is precisely what was accomplished in Florida in 2004 with the
passage of Amendment 3, a voter initiative. This amendment to the Florida State Constitution
was sponsored by the state’s medical lobbies, and it imposes caps on contingency fees in medical
malpractice cases. The amendment as passed limits contingency fees to 30 percent of the first
$250,000 awarded and 10 percent of any amounts above $250,000.36
What is remarkable and dangerous about Amendment 3 is how the medical lobbies won popular
support for it. Specifically, the Amendment was couched in misleading language suggesting
that the law’s purpose was to allow injured patients to keep more of their recovery. In reality, its
aim and impact were no different than any other contingency fee limit law: preventing injured
patients from obtaining competent counsel.
Specifically, the constitutional provision reads as follows:
(a) Article I, Section 26 is created to read “Claimant’s right to fair compensation.”
In any medical liability claim involving a contingency fee, the claimant is entitled to
receive no less than 70% of the first $250,000.00 in all damages received by the claimant,
exclusive of reasonable and customary costs, whether received by judgment, settlement,
or otherwise, and regardless of the number of defendants. The claimant is entitled to
90% of all damages in excess of $250,000.00, exclusive of reasonable and customary
costs and regardless of the number of defendants. This provision is self-executing and
does not require implementing legislation.37
When the Florida Supreme Court allowed this Amendment on the ballot, Justice R. Fred Lewis
dissented, recognizing it for what it was – an attempt to mislead voters. He wrote that the
Amendment:
attempt[s] to “hide the ball” from the voters and disguise a very clear end…[with] false
promises of benefits when [it] really…restrict[s] existing rights… Clearly, the proposed
amendment as written portrays that it will provide protection for citizens by ensuring
that they will actually personally receive a deceptive amount of all money determined as
damages in any medical liability action. However, the amendment actually has the singular
and only purpose of impeding a citizen’s access to the courts and that citizen’s right and
ability to secure representation for a redress of injuries. Its purpose is to restrict a citizen’s
right to retain counsel of his or her choice on terms chosen by the citizen and selected
counsel and to thereby negatively impact the right of Florida citizens to seek redress for
injuries sustained by medical malpractice. This is truly a wolf in sheep’s clothing.38
35

	
Id. at 29.

36

	
Fla. Const. art. I, § 26(a).

37

	
Id.

38

	
Task Force on Contingent Fees, supra note 24, at 37–38 (citing In re: Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re:
The Medical Liability Claimant’s Compensation Amendment, 880 So.2d 675, 683 (Fla. 2004) (Lewis, J., dissenting)).
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He went on to write of the Florida Medical Association, “[The FMA] should not falsely claim
they are providing a benefit to those injured by medical malpractice when they are in fact
restricting their rights to secure adequate legal representation. There really is no other purpose of
this proposed amendment.”39
3. Forced Arbitration
In 2011, the United States Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act of 1924
(“FAA”) allows corporations to strip people of their basic right to civil jury trial and force them
into private, corporate-designed systems to resolve their disputes. The case was AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion.40 The Court ruled that even when an existing state law protects individuals
from abusive forced arbitration clauses, the FAA - a law originally enacted simply to help resolve
commercial disputes between businesses – trumps these state laws.
This is a problem for several reasons. Our judicial system is designed to neutralize imbalances
between parties through procedural and substantive rights, like the right to know and rebut
evidence through discovery, cross-examination and argument, civil rules of procedure, and an
impartial judge who is guided by the substantive law. Arbitration, on the other hand, does none
of these things. Arbitrators are often on contract with the businesses against which a claim is
brought. Often the company, not the victim, is allowed to choose the arbitrator. This creates
inherent bias and self-interest on the part of the arbitrator—the arbitrator is motivated to rule
in a way that will attract future company business. At the same time, arbitration companies have
a financial incentive to side with corporate repeat players who generate most of the cases they
handle.
Arbitrators are also not required to have any legal training and they need not follow the law.
Court rules of evidence and procedure do not apply. There is limited discovery making it much
more difficult for individuals to have access to important documents that may help their claim.
Arbitration proceedings are secretive. Decisions are still enforceable with the full weight of the
law even though they may be legally incorrect. This is especially disturbing because these decisions
are binding. And sometimes, victims must split the sizeable costs of arbitration with the defense.41
Finally, “consent” to forced arbitration is hardly voluntary. These clauses are usually outlined in
tiny print, buried in documents and paragraphs and written in legalese that is incomprehensible
to most people. And because entire industries are inserting arbitration terms into contracts –
including class action waivers - there is little choice but to agree to them.
In March 2015, the federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) released a
comprehensive study about the use of forced arbitration clauses in consumer financial contracts.42
CFPB found that among the millions of transactions covered by forced arbitration clauses
between consumers and financial institutions, consumers filed very few arbitration cases. From
39
40

64

Id. at 38.
563 U.S. 333, 343–344 (2011).

41

	See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 31, 2015; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice
System,’ N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 2015.

42

	
See generally Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Arbitration Study Report to Congress, pursuant to Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1028(a) (2015), available at http://files.consumerfinance.
gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf.
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2010 through 2012, cheated consumers alone filed on average only about 400 arbitration cases
each year for six product markets combined – credit card, checking account/debit cards, payday
loans, prepaid cards, private student loans and auto loans.43 The agency found that consumers
had counsel “in roughly 60% of the cases” but “companies almost always had counsel.”44 In
addition, “[a]lmost all of the arbitration proceedings involved companies with repeat experience
in the forum,” and consumers prevailed in a little over 20 percent of cases filed in 2010 and 2011
that were resolved by an arbitrator while companies prevailed in 93 percent of cases in which
companies made claims or counterclaims that were resolved by arbitrators.45
By contrast, CFPB’s review of 419 federal consumer financial class action settlements during this
time period found that “the total amount of gross relief – defined as the total amount defendants
offer to provide in cash relief (including debt forbearance) or in-kind relief and to pay in fees and
other expenses was $2.7 billion,” and covered 350 million class members.46
Conclusion
Our uniquely-American civil justice system is a cornerstone of our democracy, fundamental
to protecting individual rights and liberties, ensuring public health and safety and restraining
abuses of power. Even the late conservative Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote eloquently
in defense of the right to civil jury trial, instructing that “a right so fundamental and sacred to
the citizen … should be jealously guarded.”47 Unfortunately, as a nation we are not doing a very
good job guarding this right. The civil justice system is an embattled and vulnerable institution in
the United States. Corporations and their insurers have been at the forefront of attacks on civil
judges and juries as industries seek to limit corporate liability exposure by blocking access to the
courts by everyday people. But Rehnquist’s admonition should give pause to any government
leader intent on further weakening our civil justice system. This nation fought a grueling and
bloody war to win these freedoms. We should not have to re-fight those battles within our own
country today. •
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Id. at Section 1, 11.
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Id. at Section 1, 12.
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Id.
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Id. at Section 1, 16 & Section 8, 4-5.

47

	Parklane Hosiery Co. Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 352 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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